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Abstract:  
This study explores the formation of buyer-seller relationships in markets with 
observable quality. We develop a model that explains why relationships form in 
equilibrium within such markets. A key feature of our model is that as individuals gain 
experience in the marketplace, they resolve uncertainty over unobserved bargainer 
types. Relationships thus form as a means to reduce such transactions costs and 
uncertainty. We explore the usefulness of our theory by using a battery of  
simulations and experimental treatments. Overall, we find that our theoretical 
predictions are largely confirmed. Interestingly, the quantitative impact of relationship 
on overall market efficiency depends critically on the extent to which market structure 
affects the matching of buyers and sellers that could profitably transact. In certain 
important cases, a greater numer of buyer-seller relationships can reduce market 
efficiency. 
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I.  Introduction 
 Economic theory highlights the importance of contractual arrangements to 
align individual interests and overcome possible market failures.  Yet, there are many 
instances where certain dimensions of a transaction cannot be contractually specified 
and enforced by neutral third parties.  This has spurred the development of a rich 
literature that examines systematically the formation and impact of long-term 
relations in labor and product markets as a means to alleviate such enforcement 
problems (see, e.g., Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Bowles, 
1985; MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989; Dixit, 2003; Levin, 2003; Brown et al., 2004).  
Intuitively, the formation of long-term relationships fosters cooperation that is 
difficult to sustain in one-shot trades.        
 In this paper, we show that long-term relationships may emerge even absent 
enforcement problems.  In our environment, standard economic models do not explain 
why relations form.  We therefore propose a new explanation, based on ex ante 
unknown differences in individual bargaining types.  As the market evolves, 
individuals learn about the bargaining strategies of other traders.  If a good match 
occurs, then both parties have an incentive to interact in the future rather than search 
for opportunities with other participants with whom they have never transacted.   
 We develop our analysis in two stages.  We first develop a very simple model 
that explains the rational emergence of buyer-seller relationships in bilateral trading 
markets that closely mimic Chamberlain’s (1948) seminal construct.1  A key feature 
of our setup is that product quality is observed and homogenous.  Thus, relationships 
cannot emerge as an efficient means to motivate sellers to provide high quality.  
Individuals initially are unaware of other’s types, but learning takes place as the 
market evolves and trades are consummated.  We implement simulations based on 
this learning process.  In a second stage, we make use of the simulation parameters to 
design a series of treatments in a field experiment.  We closely align the design of the 
simulations and experiments to allow a detailed qualitative and quantitative 
comparison of simulated and experimental data.   
                                                  
1 Such markets are not uncommon in practice.  Prior to the development of modern price systems and 
associated financial institutions in the United States, goods exchange was based primarily upon 
individual bartering and bargaining.  Some less-developed economies still rely upon such mechanisms 
for trade and the exchange of goods (e.g., Morocco).  Bilateral bargaining is fundamental to the sports 
and entertainment industries where agents for an athlete (actor) negotiate personal service contracts on 
an individual basis.  Similar behavior is observed in agriculture and commercial fisheries where 
farmers (fishermen) negotiate bilateral contracts with processors specifying prices and terms of 
exchange for harvested resource stock.   
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 We study three main outcomes in the simulations: (i) the number of 
relationships that form, (ii) the impact of relationships on the probability that a 
particular buyer or seller executes a transaction, and (iii) the impact of relationships 
on measures of surplus at both the individual and market level.  Our simulations 
provide a number of insights regarding the emergence and impact of buyer-seller 
relationships.  First, the learning model generates significantly more relationships than 
what would be expected if agents acted randomly.  Second, individuals in a 
relationship are more likely to trade in the learning model with this effect larger when 
reservation values are closer to the competitive price.  Third, average surplus is lower 
in relationships than in one-shot trades.  This leads to a fourth insight, that 
relationships can have a negative impact on overall market surplus.      
We complement these simulation results with data drawn from field 
experiments.  Overall, the experimental results replicate the qualitative nature of our 
simulations remarkably well.  First, we find that significantly more relationships form 
in our experimental markets than predicted under a model of random matching.  On 
average, buyers in our markets are approximately 40% (60%) more likely to engage in 
repeated transactions with their initial (any prior) trading partner than what is 
predicted by the random model.  Second, agents in a relationship are more likely to 
execute a trade, with this difference greater in concentrated markets.  While this 
second result leads to increased market efficiency, we find that surplus measures are 
lower in relationship trades than in single-shot transactions.  In the limit, we find that 
a greater number of buyer-seller relationships can reduce market efficiency. 
The remainder of our study is crafted as follows.  Section II reviews the 
relevant literature.  Section III presents our theoretical model and simulation results.  
Section IV outlines our experimental design.  Section V describes our results.  Section 
VI concludes.  
II.  Previous Literature 
 Our paper builds on several branches of the literature.  First, there is a rich 
literature that examines the impact of repeated interactions in markets with 
enforcement problems (see, e.g., Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; 
Bowles, 1985; MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989; Dixit, 2003; Levin, 2003; Brown et 
al., 2004).  A fundamental insight from this literature is that repeated interactions 
provide a means to overcome incentive problems that are likely to emerge when 
parties engage in single-shot transactions.  Since product quality is observed and 
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homogenous in our markets, such incentive problems do not arise.  However, 
uncertainty over the nature and bargaining behavior of other market participants can 
be viewed as a problem of transactions costs which relationships help to reduce.      
 Second, an important feature of our environment is that trade in each period 
occurs via decentralized, bilateral negotiation.  There is a large theoretical literature 
that studies the types of conditions under which Walrasian outcomes may be 
approached or attained in such bilateral markets.2  Such models do not consider 
multiple trading rounds and the emergence of buyer-seller relationships which is the 
focus of our paper.  In a similar spirit, our paper builds upon a growing experimental 
literature that examines decentralized outcomes in both the laboratory using student 
subjects (see, e.g., Chamberlain, 1948; Hong and Plott, 1982; Joyce, 1983; Grether 
and Plott, 1984) and in the field using market professionals (see, e.g., List, 2004; List 
and Price, 2006).  An important insight from these studies is that Walrasian outcomes 
are closely approximated in decentralized markets when subjects engage in multiple 
rounds of exchange or enter the laboratory with previous trading experience.  Yet our 
analysis differs from these papers in that we focus on the emergence and impact of 
buyer-seller relationships rather than testing Walrasian predictions per se.            
 Third, our paper is related to the literature on buyer-seller networks.  For 
example, Kranton and Minehart (2001) examine the formation of buyer-seller 
networks in a game with a unique trading round where link formation is costly and 
takes place before trade occurs.  This differs from our setting where trade occurs over 
several rounds and link formation is not a separate process from trade – i.e., links in 
our model arise through trade.  Corominas-Bosch (2004) studies trade patterns when 
identical buyers and identical sellers are linked through an exogenous network.  This 
contrasts from the environment considered in our paper where relationships are 
endogenously formed and market participants may differ in their valuations.  Further, 
our approach differs from the theoretical literature on networks in that we allow 
agents to trade with any other trading partner in the market.  This is a stark contrast to 
the network literature where agents can only trade if they have formed a link.   
 Fourth, our paper is closely related to the literature on reinforcement learning 
which has been used to explain buyer behavior in markets for perishable goods of 
                                                  
2 For models with complete information see Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), Gale (1986), or Jackson 
and Palfrey (1998).  For models where valuations for the good are private information, we refer the 
interested reader to Samuelson (1992) or Moreno and Wooders (2002).  
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homogenous quality (Weisbuch et al., 2000; Kirman and Vriends, 2001).  These 
models show that loyalty may emerge, and that we should expect a sharp distinction 
between loyal and non-loyal behavior.  Importantly these models suggest that loyalty 
is more likely to arise amongst buyers who visit the market more frequently and who 
purchase a greater volume.  Using transaction level data from the Marseille wholesale 
fish market, Weisbuch et al. (2000) find support for these predictions – a large 
number of cod buyers are loyal to a single seller and the extent of loyalty is increasing 
in the average volume of monthly cod purchases for a buyer. 
 There are a number of differences between their approach and ours.  First, 
loyalty emerges in their model when buyers put sufficient weight on the memories of 
past transactions in their current decisions.  As such, buyers may become loyal to a 
specific seller absent economic incentives.  Importantly, such an outcome cannot arise 
in our model.  Rather, loyalty only emerges in our model through a salient economic 
incentive – faced with uncertainty on others’ behavior, transacting with a known 
seller may be less costly than with an unknown one.  Second, the authors 
acknowledge that the level of complexity present in real markets prevents a direct fit 
of their theoretical model to data.  We would argue that such complexity also makes it 
difficult to parse different rationales for loyalty.3  In contrast, the controlled 
environment of our experimental markets dramatically simplifies this level of 
complexity and permits a more comprehensive qualitative and quantitative 
comparison of simulated and real data.    
III.  Theoretical Discussion and Simulation Results 
We wish to develop a theory of relationship formation in the marketplace that 
focuses on the role of the uncertainty over the bargaining types of the market 
participants rather than enforcement problems and reciprocal exchange. An important 
feature of our theoretical model is the assumption that product quality is observed and 
homogeneous.  However, we assume that agents are uncertain about the nature and 
bargaining behavior of potential trading partners.   
For simplicity, we develop a model with fixed bargaining behavior and two 
types – “soft” and “hard” bargainers.  In our model, bargaining type refers to the 
distinct reservation payoff an agent expects to earn from a transaction where we 
                                                  
3 In particular, the authors are unable to determine whether loyalty arises as a means to overcome 
possible information asymmetries about product quality.  To be clear, however, Kirman and Vriends 
(2001) provide a compelling argument that the effects of asymmetric information about quality should 
be minimal in the Marseille fresh fish market. 
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assume that hard bargainers seek to extract more surplus from every transaction than 
soft bargainers.  Thus, if a soft and a hard bargainer realize a trade, then the hard 
bargainer earns a higher payoff.  However, when a buyer and seller of the same type 
execute a trade, the available surplus is shared equally.  Because hard bargainers seek 
to extract greater surplus per transaction, the probability that two hard bargainers 
execute a trade is less than the probability that two soft bargainers execute a trade.   
Initially, agents are unaware of bargaining types, but individual type is 
revealed during the negotiation process.  Thus, as the number of market rounds 
(repetitions) increases, there is learning in the market that potentially influences 
behavior.  For example, a soft buyer and a soft seller who realize a trade in round t 
should start round t + 1 by commencing bargaining with one another.4  The reason 
being that at the beginning of a round, the expected utility from bargaining with a 
known soft bargainer is strictly greater than the expected utility from bargaining with 
an unknown bargainer.  Thus, soft bargainers who have previously traded should start 
every subsequent round by checking whether they can again trade.  This is a key 
mechanism that we explore below. 
 To analyze a fully rational model of repeated buyer-seller interactions under 
bargaining type uncertainty would be prohibitively complicated.5  We do not tackle 
such a comprehensive analysis here.  Rather, we study a very simple model focusing 
on the mechanism highlighted above. We assume that market participants have a 
fixed bargaining behavior and distinct reservation payoffs that represent the minimum 
amount they expect to earn from a transaction.  When a buyer and a seller bargain, 
they trade only if both can earn their reservation payoff and surplus allocation is 
determined through a simple Nash bargaining procedure.  More precisely, let the 
reservation payoff for soft bargainers equal πS and let the reservation payoff for hard 
bargainers equal πH>πS.  Now suppose that buyer i with value vB and reservation 
payoff πi bargains with seller j with value vS and reservation payoff πj.  We assume 
                                                  
4 For precision we should note that this only holds if the buyer and seller have not traded with another 
soft bargainer in a prior period.  If a buyer (seller) has previously traded with multiple soft sellers 
(buyers), they should start period t + 1 by bargaining with one of the known soft trading partners.  
5 In such a model, we would have to specify the expectations of each individual over the types of all 
the other participants.  Further, we would have to describe and model how these expectations are 
updated after each new transaction in the market. Individuals would also have expectations on the 
values of all other participants within rounds, and we would need to describe how agents dynamically 
update these expectations. Finally, we would need to describe and model how individuals condition 
their strategies on the transaction histories. 
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that if vB-vS< πi+ πj, trade does not take place. However, if vB-vB
                                                 
S≥πi+πj, then buyer i 
and seller j trade at price given by ½(vB-πi+vS+πj). 
 In the next section, we use numerical simulations to study two simple models 
with heterogeneity in bargaining types. The two models differ only in how buyers 
select the sellers with whom they will bargain.  In the random model, individuals 
simply choose their partners randomly. In the learning model, soft bargainers who 
know each other, i.e. who have traded together in the past, prefer to bargain together. 
Simulation Design: Bilateral Negotiation Markets 
 Our simulations mimic the spirit of the literature as well as the manner in 
which participants interact in our experimental markets described below.  Each 
session is comprised of 5 rounds.  At the beginning of a session, buyers and sellers are 
randomly assigned a type and at the beginning of each round they are allocated round-
specific values.  We use the same values as those in the symmetric experimental 
markets, which generates the basic supply and demand array illustrated in Figure 1.  
The perfectly competitive outcome in these markets yields $37 in rents per round and 
occurs where competitive price theory predicts a static price/quantity equilibrium of 
price = $13.00 to $14.00 and quantity = 7.  
 To capture the fact that buyers may approach various sellers within a round, 
we decompose each round into several sub-rounds, which we denote as periods.  In 
each of these periods, the matching process follows two steps.  First, each buyer 
chooses one seller to visit.  Second, sellers choose one buyer among those visitors and 
the pair of matched buyers and sellers bargain.  If bargaining is successful, then a 
trade is realized.  Otherwise, the participants approach other possible trading partners 
in the following period.  As the number of periods grows large, a greater number of 
opportunities for trade are exploited within each round. 
Importantly, we assume that a buyer and a seller who trade learn each other’s 
types.  In the learning model, this affects behavior in subsequent rounds.  We assume 
that if a soft buyer knows any soft seller, he always chooses to visit him (or one 
among them if he knows many).  If he does not know any, he selects a seller at 
random.6  Similarly, if a soft seller knows a soft buyer among the buyers visiting him, 
he always elects to bargain with him initially.  Decision rules for hard bargainers are 
 
6More precisely, he picks a seller at random among all the sellers he does not know. Any hard seller he 
may know is excluded from his choice, except, of course, if he only knows hard sellers. 
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more ambiguous than those for counterparts who are soft bargainers.7  For simplicity, 
and without loss of generality, we thus assume that hard bargainers behave randomly. 
Simulation Results: The Formation and Impact of Relationships 
 Our simulation model is characterized by 4 main parameters: the number of 
soft buyers, the number of soft sellers, the reservation payoff πS for soft bargainers, 
and the reservation payoff πH for hard bargainers.  We set the number of periods 
within a round at 20, a value for which most opportunities for trade are exploited in 
every market round, and report simulation results obtained from 1000 replications of a 
5 round session.  We first examine the performance of the random and learning 
models with respect to basic market characteristics: the average price paid per 
transaction, the average quantity traded per round, and the efficiency of the market.  
 We find that in both models the average price is approximately equal to 
$13.50 if the proportions of soft buyers and soft sellers are equal.8  We thus assume 
this property to hold in all discussion that follows.  However, while the average price 
is little affected by reservation payoffs, the average quantity traded is decreasing in 
both reservation payoffs and the proportion of participants who are hard bargainers.  
Thus, to guarantee that the average quantity traded lies between 6 and 8 units across 
all treatments, we set πS=0.5 and πH=1.5. 
The Extent of Relationships 
 Having shown that competitive price theory adequately organizes the data in 
our simulations, we now examine the extent of relationships across our various 
models.  Table 1 compares the extent of relationships emerging across the learning 
model and a model based on random matching for different proportions of soft 
bargainers.  The table presents results for markets with symmetric rent allocation and 
either four (denoted PC4) or twelve (denoted PC12) sellers, with an aggregate market 
supply as indicated in Figure 1.  Cell entries report the frequency of two different 
types of relationships that can form in the market - transactions with one’s initial 
trading partner and transactions with any prior trading partner.  In calculating these 
                                                  
7Consider a hard buyer who has traded with a soft seller in one round. Should he choose this seller 
again at the beginning of the next round? The soft seller prefers to bargain with another buyer if he can, 
but bargains with this hard buyer if he cannot find another potential buyer. If the hard buyer chooses 
this soft seller again, his probability to bargain is lower but his expected payoff conditional on 
bargaining is higher.  In contrast, a soft buyer who has traded with a soft seller in the first round always 
prefers to visit him at the first period of the second round. 
8The average price is greater than $13.50 if the proportion of soft buyers is greater than the proportion 
of soft sellers and it is lower than $13.50 if the proportion of soft sellers is greater than the proportion 
of soft buyers.   
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frequencies we consider all transactions for buyers who have already traded during a 
given five round session. In the random model, relationships form by chance as 
buyers randomly match with a particular seller in each period. The proportion of 
repeat purchases with the initial seller is thus approximately equal to 1/4=25% for 
PC4 sessions and to 1/12=8.3% for PC12 sessions in the random model. 
In contrast, the extent of relationships is significantly greater in the learning 
model in PC4 and PC12 sessions.9  This leads to a first result: 
Result 1:  The learning model generates significantly more relationships than 
the random model. The extent of relationships is increasing in the proportion 
of soft bargainers in the population. 
 
In the learning model, relations predominantly form among soft bargainers as a way 
to reduce transactions costs associated with bargaining with an unknown market 
participant.  Not surprisingly, our simulation results suggest that relations are more 
prevalent when the proportion of soft bargainers is higher.  Data from our 
experimental results described below are consistent with the learning model for a 
proportion of soft bargainers between 25% and 50%.  We thus set our baseline value 
for this proportion at 50% in the discussion that follows.10
Effect of relations on the likelihood to trade 
We now examine how relationships affect the likelihood an agent with a given 
induced value trades in both the learning and random models. Given the large amount 
of data generated in the simulations, we adopt a fully non-parametric approach. For 
example, consider a buyer with a specific buyer’s value vB.  We count over all 1000 
sessions the number of rounds where a buyer in a relationship has this value and 
obtain the realized probability to trade as the proportion of such instances where the 
buyer executes a transaction.  Similarly, we obtain the probability to trade when a 
buyer is not in a relation as the number of times a buyer with this value who is not in a 
relationship executes a trade.11
                                                  
9 The only exception to this is the case where there is only one soft seller in a PC4 session.   
10 It should be noted that we have also examined the impact of reservation payoffs on the formation of 
relationships and found almost no effect.  This is consistent with the fact that preferential bargaining 
among soft bargainers is not affected by the absolute levels of the reservation payoffs. 
11A buyer is in a relation as soon as he has traded twice with the same seller. Notice that in the round 
where this second trade happens, a trade is guaranteed and systematically counted as taking place 
within a relation. Thus, including the observations where relationships start lead to slightly 
overestimate their effect on the likelihood to trade. In the simulations we correct for this bias by simply 
removing these observations. Given data limitations, this is not feasible with our experimental 
observations. However, we use the simulations to estimate the magnitude of this bias. We find it to be 
quantitatively small. 
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Tables 2 and 3 present the probability to purchase or sell a card in the learning 
model.  Cell entries report these estimated probabilities for both the PC4 and PC12 
markets as a function of values and relationship status.  In general, we find that 
relationships have a positive impact on the likelihood to trade for both buyers and 
sellers.  These results are consistent with the underlying mechanism at work in the 
simulations. In the learning model, an individual in a relation has a higher chance to 
bargain at an early stage of each new round. This has two positive effects on the 
probability such an agent is able to trade.  First, there is a reduction in potential 
miscoordination problems in the search for a partner.  Thus, a buyer who is not 
engaged in a relation may be unlucky – i.e., unable to find a bargaining partner until 
late in the round when the good trading opportunities have been exploited.  Second, in 
the PC4 setting this creates a direct eviction effect between buyers.  By design, sellers 
first sell the units that potentially yield a higher surplus from trade.  As bargaining 
behavior is fixed, trade is more likely when two individuals bargain on higher surplus 
units. Buyers in relations are thus favored since they tend to be the first bargaining 
partners selected by a seller and are thus negotiating over lower cost units that are 
more likely to be traded. 
Intuitively, relationships have two potentially competing influences on market 
efficiency.  First, relationships may serve to stimulate trade by infra-marginal agents, 
who might not otherwise find a trading partner.  As buyers (sellers) in our simulations 
cannot trade at a price above (below) their induced value, there is a limited set of 
feasible trading partners for agents, making it possible that such agents forego rents 
purely because they cannot find a partner.12  However, relationships can also 
stimulate “bad” trades:  agents who should be out of the market given the equilibrium 
price execute trades (we denote such agents as “extra-marginal”) and this potentially 
crowds out infra-marginal agents.  As agents in a relationship are more likely to 
match and bargain early in a trading round, the probability that a buyer (seller) with 
an induced value less than (greater than) the competitive equilibrium price is able to 
find a viable trading partner increases.   
                                                  
12 For example, there are at most only 7 units which a buyer with an induced value of $14 could 
feasibly purchase.  However, if this same buyer had an induced value of $19, the number of units that 
he could purchase increases by approximately 71.4% (or 5 units).  As such, it is important that agents 
with induced values along the intensive margin match with possible trading partners early in a round 
when the number of viable trading opportunities is greatest. 
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Importantly, our simulation data permit a direct comparison of the impact of 
relationships on infra- and extra-marginal agents.  As shown in Tables 2 and 3, there 
is a pronounced asymmetry in the impact of relationships on the probability of trade: 
extra-marginal agents gain more from relationships than their infra-marginal 
counterparts.  For example, as noted in Table 2, an infra-marginal buyer with an 
induced value of $14 ($15) in a PC4 market is approximately 51.9% (17.7%) more 
likely to trade when in a relationship.  In contrast, the relative impacts are much larger 
for extra-marginal agents:  a buyer with an induced value of $13 ($12) in this same 
market is approximately 81.9% (119.8%) more likely to trade when engaged in a 
relationship.13            
 We now examine the effect of the proportion of soft bargainers on differences 
in the probability of trading.  Interestingly, we find that this proportion does not affect 
the qualitative nature of such differences – conditioned on values, agents in a 
relationship are always more likely to trade.  When the proportion of soft bargainers is 
equal to 25%, however, the estimated marginal effect is significantly lower for both 
buyers and sellers.  Given the lower prevalence of relationships in such markets, mis-
coordination and eviction problems for buyers who are not in relations are less severe, 
which serves to attenuate the positive effects of relationships.  It should be noted, 
however, that there is an endogenous limit to this effect: we find that the marginal 
effect of relationships takes quantitatively similar values when the proportion of soft 
bargainers is set equal to either 50% or 75%. Overall, we can summarize these 
findings as follows. 
Result 2:  In the learning model, market participants in relationships have a 
higher probability to trade.  This effect is stronger for extra-marginal agents 
and when the proportion of soft bargainers is greater than or equal to 50%. 
 
Having shown that relationships impact the likelihood of trade in our learning model, 
it is important to evaluate whether we observe similar impacts in the random model.  
While we find a slight positive effect in the random model, it is quantitatively much 
smaller than what is observed in the learning model and driven by selection related to 
                                                  
13 We observe similar differences for buyers in our PC12 markets and for sellers (see Table 3).  For 
example, an infra-marginal seller with an induced value of $13 ($12) in a PC4 market is approximately 
21.5% (8.7%) more likely to trade when in a relationship.  In contrast, an extra-marginal seller with an 
induced value of $14 ($15) is approximately 24.4% (79.7%) more likely to trade when engaged in a 
relationship.    
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heterogeneity in bargaining types.14  Since soft bargainers are more likely to trade 
than a hard counterpart for all values, they tend to be overrepresented among the set 
of agents that randomly form relationships. 
Surplus and Efficiency 
 In this section, we examine the effect of relationships on individual surplus 
measures and overall market efficiency.  Table 4 reports the average surplus measures 
per transaction and associated standard errors for the learning model.  We observe 
four outcomes: (i) surplus in single-shot transactions, (ii) surplus in all relationship 
trades, (iii) surplus in initial relationship trades, and (iv) surplus in subsequent 
relationship trades.  Data in the table highlight a number of insights regarding the 
impact of relationships on average surplus measures at the individual level.  First, we 
find that the overall surplus in single-shot trades is significantly greater than in 
relationship trades in both the PC4 and PC12 markets.15  On average, single shot 
trades generate surplus measures that are approximately $0.29 to $0.41 greater than 
those realized in relationship trades.  Second, this pattern holds for measures of both 
consumer and producer surplus: buyers (sellers) earn approximately $0.12 to $0.16 
($0.05 to $0.18) more per trade in single-shot transactions than in relationship trades.  
Finally, and perhaps a surprising insight, within relationships surplus in the initial 
trade is lower than the surplus realized in subsequent transactions.  
 To lend insights into these simulation results, recall that relationships mainly 
form between soft bargainers, who have lower reservation payoffs than do hard 
bargainers.  Conditioned on trading, we thus expect the average surplus to be lower 
for trades between two soft bargainers than for trades between two hard ones.  In 
addition, recall that agents in a relationship are more likely to trade extra-marginal 
units.  Because such transactions necessarily reduce gains from trade, one would 
expect a further exacerbation in the difference of average surplus between single-shot 
and relationship trades.16
                                                  
14 For instance, the marginal effect of relationships in the random (learning) model when the value is 
equal to 13 is 7.11% (25.56%) for buyers in PC4, 3.83% (14.22%) for sellers in PC4.  For agents in our 
PC12 sessions, the respective marginal effects are -0.89% (12.81%) for buyers and 3.33% (16.74%) for 
sellers.  Data from the random model simulations are available from the authors on request.   
15 To test the significance of these differences, we use a matched pairs t-test to compare the average 
surplus measure for single shot trades in a session versus the average surplus measure for relationship 
trades in that session.  As each session provides a single observation, our test statistic is thus based on a 
comparison of 1000 different averages.   
16 It should be noted that there is a secondary effect on surplus measures per trade related to the mis-
coordination and eviction effects mentioned earlier.  In the presence of relationships, hard bargainers 
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 Alternatively, the fact that, within relations, the surplus for initial trades is 
lower than for subsequent trades reflects the positive impact of relations on trades – 
agents in a relationship are more likely to match early in a trading round and bargain 
over lower cost units for which available surplus is larger.  Relative to initial 
transactions, which may occur later in a trading round, one would thus expect average 
surplus to be greater for subsequent relationship trades.  However, this effect is 
partially offset by the fact that agents who match early in a trading round are more 
likely to bargain over extra-marginal units.  
 As a robustness check, we examine the impact of changing the proportion of 
soft bargainers in the market.  Importantly, across all treatments, the results are 
qualitatively similar when this proportion is equal to 25%.  Further, we observe 
similar outcomes in PC12 sessions when the proportion of soft bargainers is 75%.   
However, it should be noted that average surplus in single-shot trades is slightly lower 
than in relationship trades in PC4 sessions when the proportion of soft bargainers is 
set to 75%.17  In this case, the extent of relationships is very high and secondary 
impacts associated with miscoordination and eviction effects dominate the direct 
effect.  Combined these insights lead to a third result.   
Result 3a:  In the learning model, the average surplus in single-shot 
transactions is greater than in relationship trades.  The sole exception is in 
PC4 sessions when the proportion of soft bargainers is set to 75%.  
 
Result 3b:  The average surplus in initial relationship trades is always lower 
than in subsequent relationship trades.  
 
Having shown that relationships impact surplus measures at the individual level, it is 
important to evaluate how these differences aggregate to the market level and impact 
measures of overall market efficiency.  While one might expect lower surplus per 
trade to suggest reduced market efficiency, the two measures need not work in the 
same direction.  Intuitively, this relationship depends on the extent to which 
individual surplus measures reflect increased trade for infra-marginal agents versus 
the effects on extra-marginal agents.  If the former effect dominates, then one would 
expect relationships to enhance market efficiency; whereas, if the latter effect 
dominates one would expect relationships to frustrate market efficiency. 
                                                                                                                                               
match with possible trading partners later in a round and bargain over units for which available surplus 
is lower.  This indirect effect serves to attenuate differences across single-shot and relationship trades. 
17 The average surplus in initial relationship trades is lower than in subsequent relationship trades in all 
treatments. 
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 To examine the impacts of relationships on aggregate market outcomes in the 
learning model, we regress the efficiency of a session (realized trade surplus over the 
5 rounds divided by the maximum available surplus) on a constant term and a proxy 
for the extent of relationships – the proportion of purchases from any prior partner.  
Table 5 reports regression results using different absolute payoff values but holding 
the difference in the reservation payoffs (πH- πS) constant.  As noted in the table, the 
effect of relationships on overall market efficiency is negative and statistically 
significant.  This leads to a fourth result: 
Result 4. Relationships can have a negative impact on overall market 
efficiency. 
 
Result 4 suggests that in the absence of enforcement problems or reciprocal exchange, 
the formation of relationships in the market may lead to a reduction in overall 
efficiency.  Intuitively, this result holds because extra-marginal individuals in 
relationships are much more likely to execute trades, serving to frustrate market 
efficiency.  Importantly, these simulation data highlight that the quantitative impact of 
relationships depends on the extent to which market structure and reservation payoffs 
affect the coordination and matching of buyers and sellers. 
 In an attempt to understand the underlying structure of Result 4, recall that 
there is a pronounced asymmetry in the impact of relationships on the probability to 
trade – extra-marginal agents gain more from relationships than their infra-marginal 
counterparts.  The final column of Tables 2 and 3 translate differences in the 
probability of trading into expected changes in overall market efficiency.  The 
formation of relationships leads to expected efficiency gains for infra-marginal values 
and expected efficiency losses for extra-marginal values.  Aggregating over all agents, 
we find that the quantitative effects are larger for extra-marginal units.18   
 Before proceeding to the experimental design and results, we wish to note two 
interesting features of our simulation data.  First, despite the low level of assumed 
rationality, market participants reach a high level of efficiency in both the learning 
                                                  
18 For example, in our PC4 markets, buyers along the intensive margin are approximately 2.87 – 51.9% 
more likely to trade when in a relationship.  In terms of overall market efficiency, this corresponds to 
an approximate 1.77% increase in expected efficiency.  However, these efficiency gains are offset by 
increased activity along the extensive margin where buyers in a relationship are approximately 81.9% 
to 11 times more likely to trade.  As this corresponds to an approximate efficiency loss of 7.05%, the 
overall impact of relationships on market efficiency is negative.  
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and random models.19  This result serves to extend recent studies of markets with 
“zero-intelligence” traders (see, e.g., Gode and Sunder, 1993; Gode and Sunder, 1997; 
Duffy and Unver, 2006).  Second, efficiency is non-monotonic in payoffs: overall 
market efficiency is initially increasing and then decreasing in assumed reservation 
payoffs.  This follows from the impact of reservation payoffs on quantities traded. 
When payoffs are low, quantities are high and there are too many trades relative to 
competitive predictions.  If payoffs increase, then quantities decrease towards the 
competitive level.  This initially has a positive impact on efficiency as the number of 
excess units traded – which necessarily reduce efficiency - declines.  When payoffs 
increase further, however, a threshold is reached after which the volume of trade is 
less than the competitive benchmark and efficiency decreases as potentially profitable 
trades are foregone. 
IV.  Experimental Design 
To complement the simulation results, we make use of field experiments in 
two distinct markets:  the sportscard market and the “flea” market.  As discussed 
elsewhere (List, 2004), both markets are characterized by consumers milling around 
the marketplace, higgling and bargaining with sellers who have their merchandise 
prominently displayed on their tables.  Temporal assignment of the physical 
marketplace is typically done by a professional association or local seller who rents a 
large space, such as a coliseum, stadium, large parking area, or a fairground, and 
allocates tables to sellers for a nominal fee.  The duration of a typical “market” is a 
day or weekend, and a lucrative market may provide any given dealer hundreds of 
exchange opportunities.   
A major advantage of this particular field experimental design is that the 
laboratory is the marketplace:  subjects would be engaged in buying, selling, and 
trading activities whether we ran an exchange experiment or were passive observers.  
An added advantage is that in the actual marketplace the natural institution matches 
quite well with our theory and simulations:  agents engage in face-to-face continuous 
bilateral bargaining in a multi-lateral market context.   
                                                  
19 This can be seen on the constant term, or by directly looking at the average efficiency across the 
1000 sessions. When payoffs are equal to 0.5 and 1.5, average efficiency in the learning (random) 
model is equal to 86.64% (87.18%) in PC12 sessions and to 89.49% (90.91%) in PC4 sessions. The 
highest average efficiency reached is equal to 89.96% (90.33%) for PC12 sessions and to 91.15% 
(91.87%) for PC4 sessions. 
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Our identification strategy is to make use of this naturalness by observing 
individuals within the multilateral decentralized bargaining market.  To execute the 
treatments, each participant’s experience typically followed four steps: (1) 
consideration of the invitation to participate in an experiment, (2) learning the market 
rules, (3) actual market participation, and (4) conclusion of the experiment and exit 
interview.20  The experimental instructions for the various treatments were standard 
and taken from Davis and Holt (1993, pp. 47-55; 1998) with the necessary 
adjustments.   
 Before proceeding to a discussion of the results, a few key aspects of the 
experimental design should be highlighted.  First, to gather the seller subject pool, a 
monitor randomly approached dealers before the market opened and inquired about 
their interest in participating in an experiment that would take about 60 minutes.  To 
gather the nondealer subject pool, a monitor randomly approached consumers 
entering the marketplace and inquired about their level of interest in participating in 
an experiment that would last 60 minutes.  Second, all individuals were informed that 
they would receive a $10 participation fee upon completion of the experiment.  And, 
following Smith (1965), a $0.05 commission for each executed trade was provided for 
both buyers and sellers to ensure that subjects would engage in transactions at their 
reservation values.   
 Third, buyers (nondealers) were informed that the experiment consisted of 5 
rounds and that they would be consumers in the experiment.  In each of 5 rounds, 
each buyer would be given a “buyer’s card,” which contained a number, known only 
to that buyer, representing the maximum price that he or she would be willing to pay 
for one unit of the commodity.  Dealers (or vendors) were informed that they would 
be sellers of up to three units in each market period.  In each of 5 rounds, each seller 
would be given a “seller’s card,” which contained numbers, known only to that seller, 
representing the minimum for which he or she would be willing to sell their units in 
the marketplace.  
 Fourth, the monitor explained how earnings (in excess of the participation and 
commission fees) were determined:  for sellers the difference between the actual 
contract price and the minimum reservation value determined producer rents.  
Likewise, buyers’ earnings were determined by the difference between the contract 
                                                  
20 A portion of the experimental design discussion follows List (2004).   
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price and the maximum reservation value.  Several examples illustrated the 
irrationality associated with selling (buying) the commodity below (above) induced 
values.   
 Fifth, the homogenous commodities used in the flea market (sportscard) 
experiments were compact discs that had been broken into two pieces (1992 Topps 
Cal Ripken baseball cards).  Thus, the assignment given to sellers was clear, and an 
everyday occurrence: sell the compact disc (Ripken card) for as much as possible.  
Likewise, the task confronting buyers was also clear: enter the marketplace and 
purchase one compact disc (Ripken card) for as little as possible.  The experimental 
commodities and participating dealers were clearly marked to ensure that buyers had 
no trouble finding the commodity of interest.  Sixth, buyers and sellers engaged in 
two five-minute practice periods to gain experience with the market.    
 Each market session consisted of 5 market rounds that lasted 10 minutes each.  
After each 10-minute round, a monitor privately gathered with buyers and gave them 
a new buyer’s card while a different monitor privately gave sellers a new seller’s 
card.21  The private values were determined randomly to ensure that serial correlation 
was not introduced.  At the conclusion of the experiment subjects were paid their 
earnings in private. 
This procedure was followed in each of five experimental treatments.  Table 6 
summarizes the experimental design employed in our analysis and can be read as 
follows: row 1, column 1 contains treatment PC12.  In this baseline treatment, the 
market is comprised of 12 buyers (12 sellers) each with unit demand (supply).  Figure 
1 presents buyer and seller induced values, which are taken from Davis and Holt 
(1993, pp. 14-15).  In figure 1, each step represents a distinct induced value that was 
given to buyer (demand curve) and sellers (supply curve).  The perfectly competitive 
outcome in this treatment yields $37 in rents per round and occurs where competitive 
price theory predicts a static price/quantity equilibrium of price = $13.00 to $14.00 
and quantity = 7.   
Treatment PC4 is identical to PC12 except for one important deviation: rather 
than having twelve sellers each providing a single unit of the good, aggregate supply 
is derived from four sellers each providing three units of the good.  Importantly, it 
                                                  
21 During the experiment, buyers mill around the marketplace and approach various dealers, who are 
situated at clearly marked tables located throughout the floor of the sportscard show (flea market), to 
bilaterally negotiate the purchase of the Ripken card (compact disc).    
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should be noted that in this treatment sellers are required to sell their lowest cost units 
first.  All remaining market parameters are identical to those in the PC12 sessions, 
with the same competitive equilibrium predictions. 
Treatment PED12 (denoting perfectly elastic demand) is identical to PC12 
except for one important deviation: rather than a downward sloping aggregate demand 
schedule that is perfectly symmetric to the aggregate supply curve, demand is held 
perfectly elastic at a price of $13.50.  Treatment PES12 (denoting perfectly elastic 
supply), holds supply perfectly elastic at a price of $13.50.  In both of these 
asymmetric treatments, competitive price theory predicts an equilibrium 
price/quantity outcome of price = $13.50 and quantity = 7.  This yields rents of 
$18.50 per round that are allocated entirely to one side of the market – sellers in 
PED12 and buyers in PES12. 
In summary, in each treatment the monitor gives each buyer (seller) a 
reservation price for one (three) units of a commodity (either a broken compact disc 
or Cal Ripken baseball card) and allows agents to engage in bilateral haggling and 
bargaining until they enact a contract(s) or the trading period terminates.  After each 
contract is completed, (i) a monitor posts the exchange price on a public board, and 
(ii) monitors inform all buyers and sellers of the exchange price in case they are 
removed from the public board.  In total, the experiment includes data from thirteen 
unique experimental sessions (65 market periods).  Since each buyer and seller 
competed in only a single treatment, our experiment included 208 total subjects: 120 
consumers and 88 dealers. 
V.  Experimental Results 
 We begin our empirical analysis by examining the relative frequency with 
which agents engage in repeated transactions with a given trading partner.  As with 
the simulation results, we are interested in two distinct types of interactions: (i) 
purchases from any prior trading partner and (ii) purchases from a buyer’s initial 
trading partner.   
Table 7 summarizes the frequency with which each of these types of 
transactions occurs in our various experimental treatments.  In total, we observe 275 
purchases by buyers who have already engaged in at least one prior transaction in the 
market.  Assuming buyers were to match with a randomly determined seller, we 
would expect at most 38 (or 13.9%) of such purchases to be from an initial trading 
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partner. 22  Yet, we observe a total of 54 units (or 19.6%) bought from an initial 
trading partner with this 5.7% difference statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level 
using a test of proportions.  Importantly, the proportion of purchases from an initial 
trading partner is significantly greater than that expected under random behavior if we 
restrict attention to only the subset of asymmetric twelve seller markets, the pooled 
subset of twelve seller markets, or the pooled subset of four seller markets.    
Similar data patterns emerge if we examine the proportion of trades from any 
prior trading partner.  In total, we observe 81 units (or 29.5%) purchased from any 
previous trading partner.  Under a model of random behavior, we would only expect 
51 units (or 18.43%) purchased from a previous trading partner.23  This 11.07% 
difference in proportions is statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level using a test of 
proportions.  Examining outcomes at the individual level yields similar insights.  For 
example, buyers are 10.28% (7.08%) more likely to purchase from a prior trading 
partner in our four (twelve) seller markets than what is predicted under a random 
match.  Both of these differences are statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level.       
Recall that induced values in our experimental markets are privately known 
and independent of the actions taken by a potential trading partner.  Ceteris paribus, 
we would thus expect agents to be indifferent amongst a set of potential trading 
partners: our markets are devoid of lemons problems and reciprocal exchange is 
unlikely as agents do not observe the payoffs received by trading partners.  Combined 
with insights garnered from raw data presented in Table 7, this suggests a fifth result: 
Result 5:  Relationships form in experimental markets absent enforcement 
problems and known reciprocal exchange when agents bilaterally negotiate 
terms of trade.   
 
Consistent with our simulation results, we find evidence that the extent of relationship 
trades in the market is significantly greater than what is predicted by a model of 
random behavior.  This result extends insights from the literature that relationships 
form as a means to alleviate incentive problems or induce reciprocal exchange, and 
                                                  
22 This 13.9% probability is constructed using a weighted average of the probability a buyer randomly 
matches with the first seller with whom they traded in our four seller (25%) and twelve seller (8.3%) 
sessions, respectively.  We use the observed proportion of total trades in each session as our weights.       
23 To calculate the baseline probability for a model of random matching, we use a weighted average of 
probability of purchasing a given unit from a prior partner.  For our four seller markets, the respective 
probabilities are 25%, 43.75%, 57.81%, and 68.36% for second, third, fourth, and fifth unit purchases.  
For our twelve seller markets, these associated probabilities range from 8.33% for purchases of a 
second unit to 29.39% for purchases of a fifth unit.  Details for these computations are available from 
the authors upon request.   
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importantly suggests an alternate reason for the formation of relationships in the 
marketplace:  uncertainty over the bargaining type of a potential trading partner.   
Effect of Relationships on the Likelihood to Trade 
 Having found that agents in our experimental market engage in repeated trade, 
we now examine the impact of such relationships on the likelihood an agent with a 
given induced value executes a transaction.  To examine this likelihood we estimate 
models of the probability a buyer (seller) with a reservation value (marginal cost) in 
the range $9-15 ($10-17) executes a transaction in our experimental sessions that 
explicitly control for observable and unobservable differences across agents.24  We 
make use of Butler and Moffit’s (1982) random effects probit model to estimate 
separately the decision to buy (sell) for each buyer (seller) to gain insights on factors 
that influence these probabilities.  Specifically, we estimate: 
Tij = β`Xij + eij, eij ~N[0,1], 
where Tij equals unity if agent i purchased/sold a unit in period j, and equals zero 
otherwise; Xij includes the treatment effect dichotomous variables, a treatment specific 
dichotomous indicator for agents in a relationship, and other controls.25  We specify 
eij = uij + αi, where the two components are independent and normally distributed with 
mean zero.  It follows that the variance of the disturbance term eij is Var(eij) = σu2 + 
σα2.  By construction, the individual random effects αi will capture important 
heterogeneity across solicitors that would be left uncontrolled in a standard cross-
sectional model. 
 Empirical estimates are presented in Table 8.  In estimating the empirical 
model, we restrict attention to our symmetric sessions as, by design, agents on the 
extensive margin cannot execute transactions in our asymmetric sessions.  As 
indicated in column 1 of the table, a buyer in a relationship is more likely to execute a 
trade than one who is not in a relationship across all market types.  However, these 
differences are only statistically significant for the PC4 and PC12 sessions in the 
sporstcard market.  Furthermore, extra-marginal buyers – i.e., buyers with an induced 
value of $13 or less – are significantly less likely to execute a trade than their infra-
                                                  
24 We concentrate on these data ranges since buyers with induced value greater than $15 always 
purchase.  Similarly, sellers with marginal costs less than $10 always sell their given unit, and no seller 
with a marginal cost greater than $17 ever executes a trade.    
25 We use a time variant indicator of relationship status that equals one once a buyer (seller) has 
purchased (sold) a unit to a previous trading partner and zero in all previous periods.  We code our 
indicator variable as one in the period in which such transactions occur. 
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marginal counterparts.  We observe similar results in columns 2 and 3 which augment 
the regressor vector to include controls for the dollar difference between buyer’s 
induced value and the mid-point of the CE price tube ($13.50) and the interaction of 
this difference with the indicator for a buyer in a relationship.   
 Exploring this result in greater detail, we find that the impact of relationships 
is larger for extra-marginal buyers.  For example, as indicated in Table 9, a 
relationship buyer with an induced value of $13 in the PC12 treatment in the sports 
card market is approximately 40.7% more likely to purchase a card than would a 
similar buyer who engages solely in single-shot interactions with different sellers.  
We observe similar differences in our PC4 sessions where a relationship buyer with 
an induced value of $13 in the flea (sports card) market is approximately 50.2% 
(31.8%) more like to trade. 
 If we consider induced values further from the margin, similar data patterns 
emerge.  For example, in our PC12 treatment buyers with an induced value of $11 are 
approximately 27.7% more likely to trade when in a relationship.  For buyers with an 
induced value of $12, there is an approximate 57.1% increase in the probability of 
trading when in a relationship.  Insights from our experimental data are thus 
qualitatively similar to those observed in our simulations:  agents in a relationship are 
significantly more likely to trade.     
 Interestingly, the impact of relationships on the probability of purchasing an 
extra-marginal unit is greater in our PC12 markets: the marginal effect of a 
relationship is approximately 3.04 – 18.9% greater in our PC12 sessions.26  In terms 
of overall market efficiency, this translates into an approximate 1.1 – 4.6% increase in 
expected efficiency loss in our PC12 markets as opposed to an approximate 0.8 – 
1.7% increase in efficiency loss in the PC4 markets.27  However, this difference in the 
effect of relationships is balanced by a greater tendency for repeat purchases in PC4 
markets (47.3% versus 16.1%).  We thus observe much lower levels of relative 
efficiency loss across our four seller markets compared to the twelve seller markets.       
Relationships and Infra-Marginal Purchases 
                                                  
26 This finding contradicts results from our simulation models if the proportion of soft bargainers across 
the PC12 and PC4 markets is held constant.  However, if there are more soft bargainers in our PC12 
markets than in our PC4 markets, such a result arises in our simulations.  Future work should examine 
this issue in greater detail by attempting to control for the proportion of a given bargaining types.   
27 If a buyer with an induced value of $13 executes a trade there is a reduction of at least $1 in total 
surplus (2.7% of the total available surplus).  When a buyer with an induced value of $12 ($11) 
executes a trade the surplus loss is approximately 5.4% (8.1%) of total available rents.   
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 Having found that the formation of buyer-seller relationships lowers efficiency 
by increasing the likelihood that an extra-marginal buyer executes a transaction, we 
now examine whether there is a compensating positive effect on overall market 
efficiency through the stimulation of otherwise foregone infra-marginal trades.  
Evaluating these predicted probabilities in Table 9, we find that an infra-marginal 
buyer who has formed a relationship in our PC12 treatment is approximately 3.05 – 
18.63% less likely to forego trades.  Given that foregone trades by a buyer with an 
induced value of $14 ($15) generates a $1 ($2) loss in total surplus, the formation of 
relationships enhances expected efficiency by 0.5 – 1.6% through the stimulation of 
otherwise foregone purchases.  In our four seller market treatments, expected 
efficiency is enhanced by approximately 0.01 – 0.1% through the stimulation of 
otherwise foregone infra-marginal purchases. 
 Combined with insights presented above, these data suggest that we should 
observe lower measures of surplus in relationship trades than single-shot interactions 
in our experimental markets: relationships have a relatively larger impact on extra-
marginal agents.  Interestingly, however, the impacts on both margins are less 
pronounced in concentrated markets – i.e., those with four rather than twelve sellers.  
We thus observe lower efficiency levels in our twelve seller markets.  These insights 
suggest a sixth result:   
Result 6a:  There is an asymmetry in the impact of relationship for infra- and 
extra-marginal agents. As the quantitative effects are larger for extra-
marginal agents, partner formation reduces market efficiency.   
 
Result 6b:  Efficiency loss due to partnership formation is attenuated by 
increased market concentration. 
 
For buyers, the formation of relationships generates both expected efficiency gains for 
infra-marginal agents through a reduction in the probability of a foregone purchase 
and expected efficiency losses for extra-marginal agents through an increased 
probability of executing trades.  However, the negative impacts of extra-marginal 
agents crowding out infra-marginal agents who have not formed partnerships 
generates an overall reduction in expected buyer surplus and overall market 
efficiency.              
Relationships and Extra-Marginal Sales 
 Empirical estimates from a model that examines the probability that a seller 
executes a trade are presented in Table 10.  In estimating the empirical model, we 
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restrict attention to those sellers in our three symmetric market treatments with 
induced values in the range $10.00 – $17.00.28  As indicated in column 1 of Table 10, 
a seller that has formed a relationship in a PC12 or flea market session is significantly 
more likely to sell a unit than an otherwise identical seller who does not form a 
relationship.29  Furthermore, sellers are significantly less likely to sell an extra-
marginal unit with this impact greater in our four seller treatments. 
 We observe similar results for the PC12 sessions in columns 2 and 3 of the 
table, which augment the regressor vector to control for i) the difference between a 
seller’s induced marginal cost and the $13.50 midpoint for the competitive 
equilibrium price tube and ii) the interaction of this difference with our indicator for a 
seller that has formed a relationship.  Interestingly, upon conditioning on induced 
marginal costs, there is no significant impact of relationships on the probability to 
trade in our four seller markets.  However, there remains a significant impact of 
relationships on the likelihood of extra-marginal trades in our twelve seller markets 
once we condition on induced marginal cost.  
 Exploring this result in greater detail in Table 11, we observe that a seller in a 
relationship in a PC12 session is approximately 3.49 – 37.46% more likely to sell an 
extra-marginal unit than an otherwise identical seller who has not entered a 
relationship.  In contrast, the marginal impact of relationships on extra-marginal 
trades in a PC4 session in the sportscard market is significantly lower:  such sellers 
are approximately 0.91 – 5.78% more likely to trade.  In terms of overall market 
efficiency, these differences in probability translate into increases in expected 
efficiency loss of 0.1 – 0.2% in the PC4 sportscard sessions and 0.4 – 2.1% in the 
PC12 sessions.30          
Relationships and Infra-Marginal Sales 
 Examining the probability of a foregone sale in Table 11, we find that such 
outcomes are independent of relationship status in the four seller sportscard markets: 
the marginal effect of a relationship on infra-marginal sales ranges from 0.18 – 2.4 
percent in these sessions.  Thus, the formation of relationships in these markets has no 
                                                  
28 We restrict attention to sellers with induced values in this range as a seller with an induced marginal 
cost of $18 never executes a transaction and every seller with marginal cost less than $10 always trade.   
29 It should be noted that while sellers in a PC4 session in the sports card market are more likely to 
realize a transaction when in a relationship, this difference is not significant at any meaningful level. 
30 If a seller with an induced value of $17 executes a trade there is a reduction in overall market surplus 
of at least $4 (10.8% of total available surplus).  When a seller with an induced value of $14 executes a 
trade, the reduction in overall market surplus is at least $1 or 2.7% of total available rents.   
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discernable positive impact on expected market efficiency.  However, relationships 
have a greater impact on infra-marginal sales in PC12 and the flea market sessions.  
The marginal effect of relationships in these sessions range from 3.59 – 30.6% 
depending upon the seller’s induced marginal cost.  This generates an approximate 0.2 
– 1.1% increase in expected seller surplus and overall market efficiency. 
 Combined with insights garnered from empirical models of buyer behavior, 
these data highlight an interesting asymmetry in the effect of relationships on surplus 
measures.  For buyers, the formation of relationships generates both expected 
efficiency gains through a reduction in the probability of a foregone purchase for 
infra-marginal buyers and expected efficiency losses through an increased probability 
of executing trades among extra-marginal buyers.  Yet, for infra-marginal sellers, 
relationships have a negligible impact on the probability of stimulating otherwise 
foregone sales.  However, relationships do impact the probability of extra-marginal 
sales, generating a loss in expected market efficiency on the seller side of the market.  
Thus, efficiency loss among sellers is qualitatively consonant with losses found 
among buyers. 
Surplus and Its Division in Long-Term Relationships 
 Having shown that agents in our experimental markets who have formed a 
relationship with a particular trading partner are more likely to execute trades, we now 
examine the impact of such increased trade volume on overall surplus and the division 
of rents between buyers and sellers.  Table 12 provides a comparison of the average 
surplus per transaction for trades that occur between a buyer and seller that trade 
together on a single occasion with that for all trades that occur between a buyer and 
seller in a relationship.  As noted in the first two columns of the table, average surplus 
per transaction in one-shot interactions is approximately 1% to 22.9% (or $0.05 - 
$0.97) greater in four of our five treatments – treatment A12 provides the lone 
exception.  However, this difference is only statistically significant for the PC4 
sessions in the sportscard market.  If we exclude from the analysis initial relationship 
trades, we observe qualitatively similar results.  In all but the PC4 session in the flea 
market, average surplus in one-shot interactions is greater than that for repeat trades in 
a relationship with these differences significant at the p < 0.10 level in the PC12, 
PED12, and PES12 treatments.   
 Comparing differences in consumer surplus across single-shot and relationship 
trade, we observe data patterns that mirror those noted for total surplus.  Considering 
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all transactions, average consumer surplus in single-shot transactions is significantly 
greater than that for relationship trades in three of our five market types.  Similar 
differences emerge if we exclude initial relationship trades: consumer surplus for 
single-shot trades in greater in the PED12, PES12, and PC12 treatments.    
 Comparing the effect of relationships on measures of producer rents, we 
observe a more variable data pattern.  Averaging over all transactions, producer rents 
in symmetric markets are greater in single-shot than in relationship transactions with 
this difference significant at the p < 0.10 level for the PC4 treatment in the sportscard 
market.  In asymmetric markets, we observe an opposite result: producer rents are 
greater at the p < 0.10 level in relationships than in a one-shot interaction.  However, 
if we exclude initial relationship trades, producer surplus is greater in one-shot 
interactions in four of our five treatments with the 14.3% and 52.2% respective 
differences for the PED12 and PC12 markets significant at the p < .10 level.  
Combined, these data suggest a final result: 
Result 7:  Surplus per transaction is potentially compromised by relationships.   
 
Importantly, these data suggest that the quantitative impact of relationships depends 
upon the extent to which market structure affects the coordination and matching of 
buyers and sellers that could profitable transact.  
 Recall that in our theoretical model, relationships serve to stimulate trade by 
reducing the costs of searching for a “soft” trading partner.  Given that there are two 
distinct sources of potential inefficiency in our experimental markets – foregone 
trades among infra-marginal agents and executed trades among extra-marginal agents 
– the overall impact of relationships on efficiency will depend on the relative impact 
on each margin.  In markets where infra-marginal agents are unlikely to meet and 
trade, relationships may stimulate such trades and enhance overall market efficiency.  
In markets with no such coordination failure, relationships will likely have a greater 
impact among extra-marginal consumers, leading to a reduction in overall market 
performance. 
VI.  Conclusions 
 This study explores behavior in multilateral decentralized bargaining markets 
and finds that buyer-seller relationships emerge in the absence of enforcement 
problems and known reciprocal exchange possibilities.  We develop a model that 
assumes that agents are uncertain about the nature and bargaining behavior of 
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potential trading partners.  This uncertainty motivates agents to form relationships.  
The key feature of our model is that once individuals have acquired experience in the 
marketplace, bargaining with a new trading partner is risky.  The new partner may 
turn out to demand a greater payoff than previous trading partners.  Relationships thus 
form as a means to reduce such transactions costs and uncertainty.   
 We evaluate our theory by executing simulations and designing a series of 
field experiments to investigate whether such relationships emerge in naturally 
occurring environments.  Empirical results from the field are in line with our 
theoretical model and simulations:  the extent of relationship trades is significantly 
greater than what is predicted by a model of random behavior.  Further, agents that 
form relationships are more likely to execute a trade.  However, as the effects are 
typically stronger for extra-marginal consumers, this leads to a reduction in average 
surplus per trade for relationship trades.  Importantly, our data suggest that the 
quantitative impact of relationships on overall market efficiency depends upon the 
extent to which market structure affects the coordination and matching of buyers and 
sellers that could profitable transact.  In a standard Chamberlain (1948) construct, 
such relationships potentially frustrate market efficiency.   
 Undoubtedly our research has raised more questions than it has answered.  For 
example, would similar patterns of behavior arise in markets that employ more 
centralized trading institutions such as posted-offer pricing and double-auctions?  In 
addition, the impact of relationships in collusive markets and markets that are highly 
inefficient remains an important question that is largely unanswered in the literature.  
We suspect that research in these areas will likely lead to insights hitherto uncovered.  
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Table 1: Proportion of Relationship Trades – Simulation Results 
 
25% 
 
 
50% 
 
75% 
 
 
Proportion of  
soft bargainers 
 
 
% with initial 
seller 
 
% with any 
prior partner 
 
% with initial 
seller 
 
% with any 
prior partner 
 
% with initial 
seller 
 
% with any 
prior partner 
 
PC4 – Learning 
Model 25.6% 39.0% 42.2% 57.1% 64.3% 76.6% 
PC4 – Random 
Model 25.2% 36.1% 25.4% 38.0% 25.6% 39.3% 
PC12 – Learning 
Model 12.3% 18.6% 24.0% 33.8% 41.1% 52.6% 
PC12 – Random 
Model 8.3% 13.2% 8.5% 13.9% 8.5% 14.4% 
 
Note: Cell entries provide the frequency with which a buyer purchases a second or subsequent unit 
from a seller with whom they have previously traded. 
 
Table 2: Probability of Buying a Card – Simulations, Learning Model 
 Buyer in a 
Relationship 
Buyer Not in a  
Relationship 
Marginal Effect of 
a Relationship 
Marginal Effect 
on Market Surplus 
PC4 Markets     
Value = 9 8.43% 0.72% 7.71% -1.04% 
Value = 10 22.04% 4.15% 17.89% -1.93% 
Value = 11 36.73% 10.71% 26.02% -2.11% 
Value = 12 43.52% 19.80% 23.72% -1.28% 
Value = 13 56.76% 31.20% 25.56% -0.69% 
Value = 14 80.67% 53.08% 27.59% 0.74% 
Value = 15 94.96% 80.66% 14.30% 0.77% 
Value = 16 99.70% 96.91% 2.79% 0.22% 
Value = 17 100.00% 99.66% 0.34% 0.04% 
Value = 18 100.00% 99.97% 0.03% 0.004% 
Value = 19 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PC12 Markets     
Value = 9 8.98% 1.40% 7.58% -1.02% 
Value = 10 12.38% 8.28% 4.10% -0.44% 
Value = 11 31.85% 18.38% 13.47% -1.09% 
Value = 12 48.03% 33.38% 14.65% -0.79% 
Value = 13 60.79% 47.98% 12.81% -0.35% 
Value = 14 86.26% 66.12% 20.14% 0.54% 
Value = 15 97.70% 87.62% 10.08% 0.54% 
Value = 16 99.72% 98.22% 1.50% 0.12% 
Value = 17 100.00% 99.34% 0.66% 0.07% 
Value = 18 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Value = 19 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Note:  Cell entries provide the probability a buyer with a given induced value will execute a trade.  The 
final column provides the lower bound on the change in market surplus associated with the increased 
propensity for a buyer with a given induced value to execute a trade.    
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Table 3: Probability of Selling a Card – Simulations, Learning Model 
 Seller in a 
Relationship 
Seller Not in a  
Relationship 
Marginal Effect of 
a Relationship 
Marginal Effect 
on Market Surplus 
PC4 Markets     
Value = 8 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Value = 9 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Value = 10 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Value = 11 99.90% 99.73% 0.17% 0.01% 
Value = 12 90.74% 83.49% 7.25% 0.39% 
Value = 13 80.42% 66.20% 14.22% 0.38% 
Value = 14 64.69% 52.01% 12.68% -0.34% 
Value = 15 19.78% 11.01% 8.77% -0.47% 
Value = 16 12.07% 4.43% 7.64% -0.62% 
Value = 17 6.87% 2.65% 4.22% -0.46% 
Value = 18 1.41% 0.30% 1.11% -0.15% 
     
PC12 Markets     
Value = 8 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Value = 9 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Value = 10 100.00% 99.62% 0.38% 0.04% 
Value = 11 99.60% 97.57% 2.03% 0.16% 
Value = 12 97.87% 85.98% 11.89% 0.64% 
Value = 13 82.10% 65.36% 16.74% 0.45% 
Value = 14 71.28% 46.84% 24.44% -0.66% 
Value = 15 50.57% 31.78% 18.79% -1.01% 
Value = 16 33.63% 18.37% 15.26% -1.24% 
Value = 17 24.59% 6.67% 17.92% -1.94% 
Value = 18 8.52% 1.55% 6.97% -0.94% 
 
Note:  Cell entries provide the probability a seller with a given induced value will execute a trade.  The 
final column provides the lower bound on the change in market surplus associated with the increased 
propensity for a seller with a given induced value to execute a transaction.  
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Table 4: Average Surplus Measures per Transaction – Simulation results 
 Single Trade with 
Partner 
Relationship Trade 
  All Trades Initial Trade Subsequent 
Trades 
PC12     
Consumer $2.17 
(0.01) 
$2.01 
(0.01) 
$1.94 
(0.01) 
$2.06 
(0.01) 
Producer $2.20 
(0.011) 
$1.95 
(0.01) 
$1.87 
(0.01) 
$2.01 
(0.01) 
All $4.37 
(0.02) 
$3.96 
(0.02) 
$3.80 
(0.02) 
$4.07 
(0.02) 
PC4      
Consumer $2.35 
(0.01) 
$2.24 
(0,012) 
$2.11 
(0.01) 
$2.31 
(0.01) 
Producer $2.40 
(0.01) 
$2.22 
(0.01) 
$2.09 
(0.01) 
$2.30 
(0.013) 
All $4.75 
(0.02) 
$4.46 
(0.03) 
$4.20 
(0.02) 
$4.61 
(0.03) 
Note: The difference between the mean values in columns 1 and 2 is significant at the p < 0.01 level 
for all rows except for consumer surplus in PC4 where it is significant at the p < 0.05 level. The 
difference between the mean values in columns 3 and 4 is significant at the p < 0.01 level for all rows.   
 
 
 
Table 5: Effect of Relations on Overall Market Efficiency – Simulation results 
  
πS = 0 
πH = 1 
πS = 0.5  
πH = 1.5 
πS = 1 
 πH = 2 
πS = 1.5 
πH = 2.5 
πS = 2 
πH = 3 
PC12      
Constant term 83.12 
(0.66) 
87.74 
(0.41) 
90.89 
(0.29) 
91.19 
(0.23) 
88.99 
(0.21) 
 # of relationships -5.93** 
(1.79) 
-2.81* 
(1.19) 
-3.75** 
(0.91) 
-4.57** 
(0.77) 
-4.23** 
(0.80) 
PC4      
Constant term 89.20 
(0.75) 
91.43 
(0.58) 
92.16 
(0.44) 
92.28 
(0.44) 
91.64 
(0.41) 
# of relationships -5.13** 
(1.27) 
-2.98** 
(1.01) 
-2.00* 
(0.80) 
-3.80** 
(0.84) 
-8.78** 
(0.81) 
** Denotes statistical significance at p < 0.01 level 
* Denotes statistical significance at p < 0.05 level 
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Table 6: Experimental Design 
Demand/Supply Structure Sports Card Market 
(1) 
Flea Market 
(2) 
Symmetric   
 PC12: 
12 Buyers – Unit Demand 
12 Sellers – Unit Supply 
3 Sessions 
N = 72 
 
 PC4: 
12 Buyers – Unit Demand 4 
Sellers – 3 Units Supply 
3 Sessions, N = 48 
PC4: 
12 Buyers – Unit Demand 4 
Sellers – 3 Units Supply 
1 Session, N = 16 
Asymmetric   
Perfectly Elastic 
Demand 
PED12: 
12 Buyers – Unit Demand 
12 Sellers – Unit Supply 
3 Sessions, N = 72 
 
Perfectly Elastic 
Supply 
PES12: 
12 Buyers – Unit Demand 
12 Sellers – Unit Supply 
3 Sessions, N = 72 
 
Note: Each cell represents one unique treatment.  For example, PC12 in row 1 of col 1 denotes that one treatment 
(three sessions) had 12 buyers and 12 sellers competing in markets in which the demand and supply curves were 
symmetric.  Data for treatments PC12, PED12, and PES12 come from List (2004).  Data for the PC4 treatments in 
both the card and flea markets come from List and Price (2006).  No subject participated in more than one 
treatment. 
 
Table 7: Proportion of Purchases made from Prior Trading Partner 
 #  with Initial 
Seller 
# with Any 
Prior Partner 
Total # of 
Trades 
% with 
Initial Seller 
% with Any 
Prior Partner 
PC4 Sessions 
Flea Market 
13 13 18 72.2%** 72.2%** 
PC4 Sessions 
Card Market 
18 31 75 24.0% 41.3%** 
PC4 Sessions 
Pooled 
31 44 93 33.3%** 47.3%** 
PC12 in Card 
Market 
6 12 74 8.1% 16.2% 
PED12 in 
Card Market 
5 13 61 8.2% 21.3%* 
PES12 in 
Card Market 
12 12 47 25.5%** 25.5%** 
All Asym 
Sessions 
17 25 108 15.7%** 23.1%** 
All 12 Seller 
Sessions 
23 37 182 12.6%** 20.3%** 
Pooled 
Sample 
54 81 275 19.6%** 29.5%** 
** Denotes statistical significance at p < 0.05 level 
*   Denotes statistical significance at p < 0.10 level 
 
Note: Cell entries provide the frequency with which a buyer purchases a second or subsequent unit from a seller 
with whom they have previously traded.  The probability that a buyer randomly trades with the first seller in a PC4 
session is 25.0% and for the PC12, A12, and AS12 sessions this probability is 8.3%.  The probabilities of trading 
with any prior partner are available from the authors upon request.   
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Table 8: Probability of Purchasing a Card with Induced Value $9 – 15 
 Model A Model B Model C 
Constant – PC4 in Flea 
Market is Baseline 
0.09 
(0.38) 
-0.74* 
(0.46) 
-0.88* 
(0.49) 
Indicator for PC12 Session 0.78* 
(0.41) 
1.02** 
(0.46) 
1.09** 
(0.47) 
Indicator for PC4 Session in 
Card Market 
1.64** 
(0.59) 
1.87** 
(0.64) 
1.98** 
(0.65) 
Indicator for Extra Marginal 
Unit 
-2.00** 
(0.29) 
0.01 
(0.47) 
0.24 
(0.52) 
Indicator for Extra Marginal 
Unit in Card Market PC4 
-1.07* 
(0.59) 
-1.12* 
(0.66) 
-1.18* 
(0.65) 
Indicator for Buyer in 
Relationship in PC12 
1.02** 
(0.48) 
1.49** 
(0.56) 
1.08* 
(0.62) 
Indicator for Buyer in 
Relationship in PC4 
0.88** 
(0.41) 
0.96* 
(0.51) 
0.67 
(0.54) 
Indicator for Buyer in 
Relationship in Flea Market 
1.10 
(0.69) 
1.28* 
(0.73) 
1.33* 
(0.70) 
Difference of Value and CE 
Price ($13.50) 
 0.85** 
(0.18) 
1.02** 
(0.26) 
Difference of Value and CE 
Price in Relationship 
  -0.31 
(0.28) 
    
Buyer Random Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Total # of Buyers 84 84 84 
    
Total # of Observations 224 224 224 
Log Likelihood -78.63 -58.97 -58.38 
** Denotes statistical significance at p < 0.05 level 
*   Denotes statistical significance at p < 0.10 level 
 
Note:  Cell entries provide parameter estimates from a random effects probit model examining the 
probability that a buyer with an induced value in the range $9-15 execute a trade in a given period.  The 
associated standard errors for the parameter estimates are in parentheses.  Since a buyer with an 
induced value greater than $15.00 never fails to execute a trade, we limit the analysis to buyers with 
induced values of $15.00 and less.  To control for unobserved heterogeneities at the individual buyer 
level, we include buyer specific random effects.       
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Table 9: Estimated Probability of Buying a Card – By Value and Treatment 
 Buyer in a 
Relationship 
Buyer Not in a  
Relationship 
Marginal Effect of 
a Relationship 
PC4 – Card Market    
Value = 9 0.82% 0.01% 0.81% 
Value = 10 4.55% 0.01% 4.54% 
Value = 11 16.60% 0.80% 15.8% 
Value = 12 40.13% 8.23% 31.90% 
Value = 13 67.72% 35.94% 31.78% 
Value = 14 98.34% 94.63% 3.71% 
Value = 15 99.78% 99.59% 0.19% 
PC12 – Card 
Market 
   
Value = 9 4.46% 0.01% 4.45% 
Value = 10 16.11% 0.01% 16.10% 
Value = 11 39.36% 11.70% 27.66% 
Value = 12 70.88% 13.79% 57.09% 
Value = 13 87.90% 47.21% 40.69% 
Value = 14 95.05% 76.42% 18.63% 
Value = 15 99.04% 95.99% 3.05% 
PC4 – Flea Market    
Value = 9 0.55% 0.01% 0.54% 
Value = 10 3.36% 0.01% 3.35% 
Value = 11 13.35% 0.01% 13.34% 
Value = 12 34.83% 1.43% 33.40% 
Value = 13 62.55% 12.31% 50.23% 
Value = 14 79.10% 35.57% 43.53% 
Value = 15 93.57% 74.36% 19.21% 
 
Note:  Cell entries provide the predicted probability a buyer with a given induced value will execute a 
trade.  The predicted probabilities are evaluated using Model C in Table 4. 
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Table 10:  Probability of Selling a Unit with Marginal Cost $10-17 
 Model A Model B Model C 
Constant – PC4 in Flea Market 
is Baseline 
0.51 
(0.36) 
0.08 
(0.37) 
0.08 
(0.37) 
Indicator for PC12 Session 0.37 
(0.41) 
0.11 
(0.42) 
0.11 
(0.42) 
Indicator for PC4 Session in 
Card Market 
1.07** 
(0.42) 
1.05** 
(0.43) 
1.05** 
(0.44) 
Indicator for Extra Marginal 
Unit 
-2.49** 
(0.32) 
-1.25** 
(0.43) 
-1.24** 
(0.44) 
Indicator for Extra Marginal 
Unit in PC12 
0.94** 
(0.43) 
1.22** 
(0.46) 
1.22 
(0.47) 
Indicator for Seller in 
Relationship in PC12 
1.10** 
(0.52) 
0.99** 
(0.49) 
1.00* 
(0.51) 
Indicator for Seller in 
Relationship in PC4 
0.37 
(0.39) 
0.16 
(0.42) 
0.16 
(0.42) 
Indicator for Seller in 
Relationship in Flea Market  
1.52* 
(0.86) 
1.13 
(0.96) 
1.12 
(0.98) 
Difference between MC and 
CE Price ($13.50) 
 -0.45** 
(0.11) 
-0.45** 
(0.11) 
Difference between MC and 
CE Price in Relationship 
  -0.02 
(0.24) 
    
Seller Random Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Total # of Sellers 52 52 52 
    
Total # of Observations 252 252 252 
Log Likelihood -96.6 -86.54 -86.53 
** Denotes statistical significance at p < 0.05 level 
*   Denotes statistical significance at p < 0.10 level 
 
Note:  Cell entries provide parameter estimates from a random effects probit model examining the 
probability that a seller with an induced marginal cost in the range $10-17 execute a trade in a given 
period.  The associated standard errors for the parameter estimates are in parentheses.  Since a seller 
with a marginal cost less than $10.00 always executes a trade, we limit the analysis to all sellers with 
induced value of $10.00 and more.  To control for unobserved heterogeneities at the individual seller 
level, we include seller specific random effects.       
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Table 11: Estimated Probability of Selling a Card – By Value and Treatment 
 Seller in a 
Relationship 
Seller Not in a  
Relationship 
Marginal Effect of a 
Relationship 
PC 4 – Card Market    
Value = 10 99.84% 99.66% 0.18% 
Value = 11 99.33% 98.81% 0.52% 
Value = 12 97.72% 96.45% 1.27% 
Value = 13 93.63% 91.23% 2.4% 
Value = 14 42.47% 36.69% 5.78% 
Value = 15 25.3% 21.32% 3.98% 
Value = 16 12.71% 10.66% 2.05% 
Value = 17 5.37% 4.46% 0.91% 
PC 12 Sessions    
Value = 10 99.78% 96.19% 3.59% 
Value = 11 99.12% 90.68% 8.44% 
Value = 12 97.14% 80.76% 16.38% 
Value = 13 92.34% 66.11% 26.23% 
Value = 14 82.36% 47.61% 34.75% 
Value = 15 67.84% 30.38% 37.46% 
Value = 16 42.47% 16.7% 25.77% 
Value = 17 11.17% 7.68% 3.49% 
PC 4 – Flea Market    
Value = 10 99.78% 95.15% 4.63% 
Value = 11 99.13% 88.63% 10.5% 
Value = 12 97.17% 77.52% 19.65% 
Value = 13 92.44% 61.84% 30.6% 
Value = 14 38.82% 8.38% 30.44% 
Value = 15 22.42% 3.26% 19.16% 
Value = 16 10.87% 1.08% 9.79% 
Value = 17 4.36% 0.31% 4.05% 
Note:  Cell entries provide the predicted probability a seller with a given induced marginal cost will 
execute a trade.  The predicted probabilities are evaluated using Model C in Table 6. 
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Table 12: Average Surplus Measures per Transaction  
 Single Trade with 
Partner 
Relationship Trade 
  All Trades Initial Trade Subsequent 
Trades 
PC12     
Consumer $2.25c
(0.18) 
$1.97 
(0.27) 
$2.17 
(0.49) 
$1.78 
(0.27) 
Producer $2.36c
(0.17) 
$1.92 
(0.38) 
$2.28 
(0.67) 
$1.55 
(0.37) 
Total $4.61c
(0.30) 
$3.89 
(0.52) 
$4.44 
(0.91) 
$3.33 
(0.5) 
PC4 – Card     
Consumer $2.29a,b
(0.20) 
$1.92 
(0.22) 
$1.67 
(0.24) 
$2.14 
(0.36) 
Producer $2.92a,b
(0.25) 
$2.32 
(0.26 
$2.23 
(0.40) 
$2.40 
(0.34) 
All $5.21a,b
(0.35) 
$4.24 
(0.39) 
$3.90 
(0.55) 
$4.54 
(0.56) 
PC4 – Flea     
Consumer $2.75 
(0.59) 
$2.78 
(0.47) 
$1.50 
(0.52) 
$3.46 
(0.60) 
Producer $2.95 
(0.73) 
$2.88 
(0.46) 
$2.93 
(0.97) 
$2.95 
(0.73) 
Total $5.70 
(0.71) 
$5.65 
(0.59) 
$4.43 
(1.29) 
$6.31 
(0.55) 
PED12      
Consumer $0.71a,c
(0.11) 
$0.50 
(0.10) 
$0.67d
(0.17) 
$0.33 
(0.10) 
Producer $1.93a,c
(0.19) 
$2.67 
(0.42) 
$3.61d
(0.53) 
$1.72 
(0.49) 
Total $2.64c
(0.21) 
$3.17 
(0.44) 
$4.28d
(0.49) 
$2.05 
(0.53) 
PES12     
Consumer $2.16a,b,c
(0.24) 
$1.24 
(0.27) 
$0.98 
(0.37) 
$1.48 
(0.40) 
Producer $0.88a,b
(0.14) 
$1.56 
(0.33) 
$2.43d
(0.53) 
$0.77 
(0.26) 
Total $3.05c
(0.23) 
$2.80 
(0.39) 
$3.41d
(0.61) 
$2.25 
(0.46) 
a – Denotes that the difference between the mean values in columns 1 and 2 is significant at the p < 0.10 level 
b – Denotes that the difference between the mean values in columns 1 and 3 is significant at the p < 0.10 level 
c – Denotes that the difference between the mean values in columns 1 and 4 is significant at the p < 0.10 level 
d – Denotes that the difference between the mean values in columns 3 and 4 is significant at the p < 0.10 level 
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Note:  The figure provides the induced supply and demand structure for our simulations and symmetric 
experimental markets.  Each step on the supply (demand) function represents a unique induced 
marginal cost (reservation value) for a respective seller (buyer).  The dashed lines provide the 
competitive benchmarks for this market with an equilibrium quantity of 7 units sold and an equilibrium 
price somewhere in the $13 – 14 
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